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J IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO RECEIVED 
KET NO. sko rat -en 
Charles G. Oman, 
Plaintiff/ 
v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 
Peabody Coal Company, Old 
Republic Insurance Company and 
Second Injury Fund, 
) 
> 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
> 
MAYDAY,' 
Brlgham Young University 
law Library 
JRCB 
OPINION 
Case No. 860189-CA 
Defendants. 
Before Judges Garff, Greenwood and Bench. 
F I L E D 
APR 151987 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Timothy M. Shea 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Plaintiff seeks modification of an order by the 
Industrial Commission awarding him permanent total disability 
benefits. The benefits were to commence as of September 24, 
1984, the date permanent total disability was first medically 
confirmed. Plaintiff urges benefits should commence from 
either the day of the industrial accident (May 12, 1975) or the 
day after he last worked for the employer (April 22, 1976), 
whichever is later. Under that theory benefits would commence 
as of April 23, 1976. Plaintiff also seeks payment of interest 
on the benefits, which was denied by the Industrial Commission. 
Plaintiff was injured in a mine cave-in on May 12, 1975 
in Huntington, Utah, while working for Peabody Coal Company 
("Peabody"). He was treated orthopedically for back problems 
and also received treatment for depression. He returned 
to work on June 15, 1975, but continued to receive medical 
treatment. On June 29, 1976, a three level fusion operation 
was performed on plaintiff, and in December, 1977, further 
surgery occurred, re-fusing plaintiff's back. Plaintiff was 
awarded compensation for a 25% permanent partial impairment of 
the whole body for his back problems on March 21, 1977. 
On June 11, 1982 plaintiff applied for a permanent total 
disability award because of psychiatric impairment. 
Plaintiffs total disability was confirmed by a letter dated 
September 9, 1984, from his physician. The doctor's 
confirmation was corroborated by other medical and mental 
health professionals. The Administrative Law Judg£ (££J)/ in 
accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1986), fnade a 
tentative finding of permanent total disability and referred 
plaintiff to the Division of Rehabilitative Services for 
evaluation, training and certification. The Division found 
that plaintiff could not be rehabilitated for employment. The 
ALJ entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order 
providing plaintiff with benefits from July 21, 1985, the date 
of certification by the Division of Rehabilitation. No 
interest on unpaid benefits was awarded. Plaintiff then filed 
a Motion for Reconsideration/Motion for Review challenging the 
commencement date of benefits and failure to order payment of 
interest. In response the Industrial Commission denied payment 
of interest but changed the benefit commencement date to 
September 24, 1984, the first date of medical confirmation. 
Plaintiff asks this Court to rule that benefits should 
commence from April 23, 1976, the day after plaintiff's last 
day of work for Peabody. Plaintiff cites Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-64 (1986) as mandating commencement of workers' 
compensation no later than three days after the injury. 
However, that section deals with total temporary disability 
rather than total permanent disability as in this case. Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1986) also uses "at the time of injury-
language to establish benefits, but only in conjunction with 
wages at the time of injury. There is no statutory language 
requiring benefits to commence at either the date of injury or 
the last day of employment, whichever occurs later. Therefore, 
plaintiff's argument is without merit. Thus, this Court must 
determine if the Commission's order was supported by 
substantial evidence and was a reasonable exercise of the 
Commission's discretion. Norton v. Indust. Commission, 728 
P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986); Hardman v. Salt Lake Citv Fleet 
Management, 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. 
Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981). 
In this instance, while the accident causing the initial 
injury occurred in 1975, it was not until years later that the 
injury developed to a point of total disability. The ALJ 
considered evidence that plaintiff had operated a business and 
received income between 1976 (when he stopped working for 
Peabody) and 1984. The ALJ's findings state that "[a]11 of the 
evidence presented by the defendants was convincing in showing 
the [plaintiff] is far from being totally invalid." Benefits 
were awarded nonetheless, consistent with the standard referred 
to in Norton, 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986). In Norton, the Court 
stated that a worker may receive benefits who is not completely 
incapacitated but is sufficiently handicapped so "that he will 
not be employed regularly in any well-known branch of the labor 
market." Norton, 728 P.2d at 1027. Plaintiff was not totally 
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and permanently disabled in 1976. His psychiatric problems/ 
which emanated from the 1975 industrial accident, became 
progressively worse, finally culminating in total permanent 
disability. As found by the ALJ, H[plaintiff] did not become 
permanently and totally disabled until after the expiration of 
the initial six year period." The Industrial Commission did 
not act unreasonably nor abuse its discretion by selecting the 
September 24, 1984, date for commencement of benefits given the 
progressive nature of plaintiff's disability and the difficulty 
of determining the exact date of maturation of the disability. 
A possible gap between full development of the disability and 
payment of benefits will not justify reversal. Booms v. Rapp 
720 P.2d 1636 (Utah 1986). We concur in the language of 
Spencer v. Indust. Commission, 87 Utah 336 40 P.2d 188 (1935): 
...whether an employee is totally disabled 
or permanently disabled are ultimate matters 
to be decided by the commissioner, as is also 
the amount and time compensation may be 
awarded upon all the evidence. I& at 197. 
It is within the sound discretion of the Industrial 
Commission to determine the commencement date of benefits for 
total permanent disability so long as the determination is 
supported by substantial evidence and not patently 
unreasonable. Substantial evidence existed in this case for 
commencing benefits as of the first date of medical 
confirmation of permanent total disability. 
Plaintiff also appeals from the Industrial Commission's 
denial of interest on unpaid benefits. Plaintiff relies on 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78 (1986) which states: 
Awards made by the Industrial Commission 
shall include interest at the rate of 8% 
per annum from the date when each benefit 
payment would have otherwise become due 
and payable. 
In Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 704 P.2d 581 (Utah 
1985) the Utah Supreme Court held that this statute must be 
retroactively applied to accrued or pending actions because its 
intent is remedial. The case before us clearly falls within 
the statutory language and pursuant to Marshall enactment of 
the statute subsequent to the injury or disability is 
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irrelevant. Plaintiff is entitled to payment of accrued 
interest on all unpaid benefits commencing from September 24, 
1984. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. No costs awarded. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
R. W. Garff, Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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